A snapshot of the practicality and barriers to COVID-19 interventions: Public health and healthcare workers' perceptions in high and low- and middle-income countries.

BACKGROUND: In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, governments have implemented a range of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) and pharmaceutical interventions (PIs) to reduce transmission and minimise morbidity and mortality, whilst maintaining social and economic activities. The perceptions of public health workers (PHWs) and healthcare workers (HCWs) are essential to inform future COVID-19 strategies as they are viewed as trusted sources and are at the forefront of COVID-19 response. The objectives of this study were to 1) describe the practicality of implementing NPIs and PIs and 2) identify potential barriers to implementation, as perceived by HCWs and PHWs. METHODS: We conducted a cross-sectional study of PHWs and HCWs perceptions of the implementation, practicality of, and barriers to implementation of NPIs and PIs using an online survey (28/9/2020-1/11/2020) available in English, French and Portuguese. We used descriptive statistics and thematic analysis to analyse quantitative and qualitative responses. RESULTS: In total, 226 respondents (67 HCWs and 159 PHWs) from 52 countries completed the survey and 222 were included in the final analysis. Participants from low and middle-income countries (LMICs) accounted for 63% of HCWs and 67% of PHWs, with the remaining from high-income (HICs). There was little difference between the perceptions of PHWs and HCWs in HICs and LMICs, with the majority regarding a number of common NPIs as difficult to implement. However, PHWs in HICs perceived restrictions on schools and educational institutions to be more difficult to implement, with a lack of childcare support identified as the main barrier. Additionally, most contact tracing methods were perceived to be more difficult to implement in HICs than LMICs, with a range of barriers reported. A lack of public support was the most commonly reported barrier to NPIs overall across both country income and professional groups. Similarly, public fear of vaccine safety and lack of vaccine supply were the main reported barriers to implementing a COVID-19 vaccine. However, PHWs and HCWs in LMICs perceived a lack of financial support and the vaccine being manufactured in another country as additional barriers. CONCLUSION: This snapshot provides insight into the difficulty of implementing interventions as perceived by PHWs and HCWs. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to implementing interventions, and barriers in different contexts do vary. Barriers to implementing a vaccine programme expressed here by HCWs and PHCWs have subsequently come to the fore internationally.

'Learn from the lessons and don't forget them': identifying transferable lessons for COVID-19 from meningitis A, yellow fever and Ebola virus disease vaccination campaigns.

INTRODUCTION: COVID-19 vaccines are now being distributed to low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), with global urgency surrounding national vaccination plans. LMICs have significant experience implementing vaccination campaigns to respond to epidemic threats but are often hindered by chronic health system challenges. We sought to identify transferable lessons for COVID-19 vaccination from the rollout of three vaccines that targeted adult groups in Africa and South America: MenAfriVac (meningitis A); 17D (yellow fever) and rVSV-ZEBOV (Ebola virus disease). METHODS: We conducted a rapid literature review and 24 semi-structured interviews with technical experts who had direct implementation experience with the selected vaccines in Africa and South America. We identified barriers, enablers, and key lessons from the literature and from participants' experiences. Interview data were analysed thematically according to seven implementation domains. RESULTS: Participants highlighted multiple components of vaccination campaigns that are instrumental for achieving high coverage. Community engagement is an essential and effective tool, requiring dedicated time, funding and workforce. Involving local health workers is a key enabler, as is collaborating with community leaders to map social groups and tailor vaccination strategies to their needs. Vaccination team recruitment and training strategies need to be enhanced to support vaccination campaigns. Although recognised as challenging, integrating vaccination campaigns with other routine health services can be highly beneficial if well planned and coordinated across health programmes and with communities. CONCLUSION: As supplies of COVID-19 vaccines become available to LMICs, countries need to prepare to efficiently roll out the vaccine, encourage uptake among eligible groups and respond to potential community concerns. Lessons from the implementation of these three vaccines that targeted adults in LMICs can be used to inform best practice for COVID-19 and other epidemic vaccination campaigns.

80 questions for UK biological security.

Multiple national and international trends and drivers are radically changing what biological security means for the United Kingdom (UK). New technologies present novel opportunities and challenges, and globalisation has created new pathways and increased the speed, volume and routes by which organisms can spread. The UK Biological Security Strategy (2018) acknowledges the importance of research on biological security in the UK. Given the breadth of potential research, a targeted agenda identifying the questions most critical to effective and coordinated progress in different disciplines of biological security is required. We used expert elicitation to generate 80 policy-relevant research questions considered by participants to have the greatest impact on UK biological security. Drawing on a collaboratively-developed set of 450 questions, proposed by 41 experts from academia, industry and the UK government (consulting 168 additional experts) we subdivided the final 80 questions into six categories: bioengineering; communication and behaviour; disease threats (including pandemics); governance and policy; invasive alien species; and securing biological materials and securing against misuse. Initially, the questions were ranked through a voting process and then reduced and refined to 80 during a one-day workshop with 35 participants from a variety of disciplines. Consistently emerging themes included: the nature of current and potential biological security threats, the efficacy of existing management actions, and the most appropriate future options. The resulting questions offer a research agenda for biological security in the UK that can assist the targeting of research resources and inform the implementation of the UK Biological Security Strategy. These questions include research that could aid with the mitigation of Covid-19, and preparation for the next pandemic. We hope that our structured and rigorous approach to creating a biological security research agenda will be replicated in other countries and regions. The world, not just the UK, is in need of a thoughtful approach to directing biological security research to tackle the emerging issues.